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Corporate governance theory predicts that leverage affects agency costs and 
thereby influences firm performance. Agency costs represent important problems 
in corporate governance in both financial and non-financial industries. Prior 
evidences have demonstrated an association between ownership structures, capital 
structure, and firm performance. 
 
This study extends the literature by proposing a further link between capital 
structure and firm performance in term of post Asian Financial Crisis that is rarely 
investigated. Using an agency framework, the research argues that the distribution 
of equity ownership among corporate managers and external block holders has a 
significant relationship with leverage and firm performance, and there is reverse 
causality effect between ownership structure, capital structure, and firm 
performance. The paper tests two hypotheses that explore various aspects of this 
relationship. This study uses 532 East Asian companies, which are located in 
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seven most affected countries when the crisis took place during period 1996-1997. 
The time frame of analysis is 2000-2001 period that is believed as a start of 
recovery period. Statistic methods used for testing the hypothesis are t-test and 
multivariate regression model. 
 
The empirical results indicate that the East Asian companies after the crisis apply 
the efficiency-risk argument. In analyzing the reverse causation of capital 
structure and corporate performance relation, the result confirms the incentive 
signaling approach, which debt can be used to signal the fact that firm has 
prospect and equity issues may be interpreted as a negative signal. 
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1.1. Problem Background  
 
The topic of optimal capital structure has been the subject of many studies. It has 
been argued that profitable firms were less likely to depend on debt in their capital 
structure than less profitable ones. It has also been argued that firms with a high 
growth rate have a high debt to equity ratio. Bankruptcy costs (proxied by firm 
size) were also found to be an important effect on capital structure (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973; Harris and Raviv, 1991). If these three factors are considered 
as determinants of capital structure, then these factors could be used to determine 
the firm’s performance. In practice, firm managers who are able to identify the 
optimal capital structure are rewarded by minimizing a firm’s cost of finance, 
thereby maximizing the firm’s revenue. If a firm’s capital structure influences a 
firm’s performance, then it is reasonable to expect that the firm’s capital structure 
would affect the firm’s health and its likelihood of default. 
 
On the other side, theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help 
mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a 
low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases 
firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of 
shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast 
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literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001). Greater financial leverage may affect 
managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes 
personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (Grossman 
and Hart, 1982),  and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest 
expenses (Jensen, 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between 
shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (Myers, 1977), 
the amount of risk to undertake (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the conditions under 
which the firm is liquidated (Harris and Raviv, 1991), and dividend policy (Stulz, 
1990). 
 
The purpose of this study is predominantly to take a closer look on the concepts 
and theories of capital structure and firm performance. This research has a closed 
relation to the relationship between ownership structure and performance. The 
survey here is to analyze the possibility of non-monotonic and endogeneity 
relationship of capital structure and firm performance. The prior researches 
generally do not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from 
performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital 
structure, then failure to consider this reverse causality may result in 
simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firm performance on a 
measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance 
with the effects of performance on capital structure. Therefore, the remainder of 
the paper is organized around two prominent hypotheses about capital structure 
and firm performance.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
  
In the relation between capital structure and firm performance, four ideas are 
relevant. The first is the incentive signaling approach. If two firms have differing 
prospects, which are known by management but not discerned by investors, debt 
can be used to signal the fact that prospects differ and equity issues may be 
interpreted as a negative signal (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Ross (1977) argues that 
a firm with better prospects can issue more debt than one with lower prospects, 
because the issue of debt by the latter will result in a higher probability of 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE STUDIES 
Vol 3, No 2, 2011   ISSN:  1309-8055 (Online) 
 
 4 
bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs, which is a costly outcome to 
management. Therefore, a higher level of debt will be associated with a higher 
level of performance. 
 
The second idea, one of resource constraints, is advanced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). In the situation where an entrepreneur has limited resources, then should 
capital be raised as equity or debt becomes an issue. The placement of equity 
dilutes an owner-manager’s share of profits, and thereby entrepreneurial 
incentives, motivating on-the-job consumption. Raising debt avoids the sacrifice 
of incentive intensity since the entrepreneur can internalize to a greater degree the 
benefits of superior profitability. Therefore, more highly leveraged firms will be 
more profitable, since the entrepreneur or owner-manager will not have 
undertaken on-the-job consumption. 
 
A firm may issue debt to persuade the market that the management will pursue 
profits, which will generate the necessary cash so as to service the debt, rather 
than indulge in managerial discretionary behavior. By issuing debt, management, 
as agent, deliberately changes its incentive structure so as to bring it in line with 
those of shareholders, the principals, because of the resulting impact on market 
value; or, in other words, management bonds itself to act in the best interest of its 
shareholders. Hence, higher levels of debt in the firm’s capital structure will be 
directly associated with higher performance levels (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
The principal hypothesis prevalent in the literature is that a higher level of debt in 
a firm’s capital structure is associated with a higher level of performance, leading 
to the generation of greater cash flows. 
 
An alternative hypothesis, however, also exists in which states that high leverage 
is associated with long-term performance declines. Debt holders are assumed to 
be more risk averse than equity holders (Smith and Warner, 1979). Consequently, 
they force managers to abandon risky projects and cut back on R&D expenditures. 
There is evidence suggesting that a negative relationship exists between R&D 
intensity and long-term debts (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). Leverage is, 
therefore, associated with decline in firms’ innovativeness and the long-run 
consequence of such decline in innovativeness is a worsening of performance. 
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2.2. Theories of Reverse Causality from Performance to Capital Structure 
 
As noted, prior researches on agency costs generally do not take into account the 
possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure, which may 
result in simultaneous-equations bias. Berger and di Patti (2002) offer two 
hypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Miller 
perfect-markets assumption. It is assumed that various market imperfections (e.g., 
taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in a balance between 
those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit 
efficiency move the optimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001). 
 
Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms that are more efficient choose lower 
equity ratios than other firms, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the 
expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under this hypothesis, higher 
profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, 
and the higher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in 
protecting the firm against future crises (Berger and di Patti, 2002). 
 
Meanwhile, franchise-value hypothesis focuses on the income effect of the 
economic rents generated by profit efficiency on the choice of leverage. Under 
this hypothesis, firms that are more efficient choose higher equity capital ratios, 
all else equal, to protect the rents or franchise value associated with high 
efficiency from the possibility of liquidation. Higher profit efficiency may create 
economic rents if the efficiency is expected to continue in the future, and 
shareholders may choose to hold extra equity capital to protect these rents, which 
would be lost in the event of liquidation, even if the liquidation involves no overt 
bankruptcy or distress costs (Berger and di Patti, 2002). 
 
These two hypotheses yield opposite predictions from one another for the effects 
of profit efficiency on equity capital or leverage. The two individual effects may 
be thought of as substitution and income effects. Under the efficiency-risk 
hypothesis, the expected earnings from high profit efficiency substitute for equity 
capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial 
distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the 
income from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Berger 
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and di Patti (2002) interpret their findings as the net effect of these two 
hypotheses. Thus, these hypotheses are only partially identifiable in the sense that 
they can only distinguish which one is more important than the other is. 
 
If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure and vice versa, then the 
failure to take this into account may result in serious simultaneity bias, with 
important implications for pattern of firm financing and performance. In the light 
of the two-way relationship between capital structure and firm efficiency, one 
needs to allow for the simultaneity between capital structure and firm 
performance. Thus, two hypotheses will be tested in this research; firstly, firms 
with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial share 
ownership, and higher firm performance are likely to have a higher debt ratio, 
ceteris paribus. The second hypothesis argues that firms with a higher level of 
external block holdings, low levels of managerial share ownership, and higher 
debt are likely to have a higher firm performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
As argued above, firms with higher profit margins may substitute outside equity 
capital for debt. On the other hand, it may also be true that firms that are more 
efficient try to protect the value of their high income by holding more equity 
capital.  
 
3. RESEARCH MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
In this paper, the test of capital structure effect on performance and its reverse 
causality is done by using 532 East Asian companies, which are located in seven 
most affected countries when the crisis took place during period 1996-1997.  
 
By replicating and adapting the work of Brailsford et al. (2002), the first 
hypothesis proposes that firms with higher firm performance, higher levels of 
external block holdings, and low level of managerial share ownership will have 
higher debt ratio. This hypothesis is tested by regressing the dependent variable, 
ln (D/E) against the Tobin’s Q and ROE, the external block ownership (EBO), the 
managerial share ownership (MSO), and control variables. Meanwhile, for the 
two-way relationship between capital structure and firm performance, the second 
hypothesis is tested by regressing the dependent variables, Tobin’s Q and ROE 
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against ln (D/E), the external block ownership (EBO), the managerial share 
ownership (MSO), and control variables. 
 
There are two variables used to control for risk, i.e. size, which is natural log of 
total assets, and industry classification, which is IND = 1 if industrial company 
and IND = 0 if natural resources company. The three variables used to control for 
agency costs are growth (G), which is the annual percentage change in total assets 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988), free cash flow (FCF), which is a direct measure of 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, and profitability (PROF), which is 
operating income before interest and taxes scaled by total assets (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). To measure asset specificity, it is used two variables control, i.e. 
intangible assets to total assets (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993) and to measure the 
effect of taxes is used non-debt tax shield, which is put forward by DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980). 
 
3.1. Research Results 
 
A positively and significantly relation between Tobin’s Q and leverage can be 
interpreted that the East Asian companies after the crisis apply the efficiency-risk 
hypothesis (see Table 1). It means higher profit efficiency has generated a higher 
expected return for those companies in a given capital structure, and the higher 
efficiency has substituted to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm 
against future crises. In the other words, firms with high-expected returns owing 
to high profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. It is also interpreted that 
firms that are more efficient are considered from lenders as more solvent and 
consequently they can be expected to be more leveraged than less efficient ones. 
This result is consistent with Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) that tested the effect of 
Tobin’s Q on leverage in Indian companies post East Asian crisis. They found that 
the Tobin’s Q is related positively and significantly to leverage in low and high 
growth firms. 
 
The negative and significant coefficient for IND (industry) variable could be as a 
result of the negative ROE value for some firms included in the analysis as a 
result of distress. It also means that natural resource companies in East Asia less 
use leverage as source of expanding. Meanwhile, GROWTH variable has a 
negative and significant coefficient that means firms with high debt levels 
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sometimes forego of an investment project in spite of expectations of high returns 
because of the reluctance of creditors to finance the project. 
 
Table-1:  The Statistical Results of the Relation between Capital Structure and Firm 
Performance 
The Effect of Firm Performance 
Measures on Capital Structure 
The Effect of Capital Structure on  
Firm Performance Measures 
Ln (D/E)it  = 
α0 + β0 Tobin-Qit + β1 ROEit + 
β2 MSOit + β3 MSO2it + β4 EBOit + 
β5 (D*EBOit) + β6 SIZEit + β7 INDit 
+ β8 GROWTHit  +β9 PROFit  + β10
FCFit + β11 INTAit + β12 NDTSit + eit 
Tobin-Qit or ROEit = 
α0 + β0 Ln (D/E)it + β1 MSOit + β2 MSO2it + 
β3 EBOit + β4 (D*EBOit) + β5 SIZEit + β6 INDit  
+    β7 GROWTHit  + β8 PROFit  + β9 FCFit + β10 
INTAit + β11 NDTSit + eit 
Ln D/E Tobin’s Q ROE 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant -2.450 -9.027 -1.007 -4.087 -1.007 -4.087 
D/E   .069 1.832*** .010 .079 
Tobin’s Q .093 1.829***     
ROE .000 .010     
MSO 2.758 2.305** -1.718 -1.671*** -3.245 -.942 
MSO2 -3.857 -2.023** 4.059 2.489** 4.209 .770 
EBO .781 3.355* .581 2.904* -.117 -.174 
D(EBO) -.220 -1.095 .113 .655 .404 .701 
SIZE .240 7.075* -.050 -1.646*** .034 .334 
Industry -.253 -2.459** .059 .663 -.200 -.674 
GrowthTA -.002 -2.239** 3.46E-005 .054 .000 .075 
PROF -2.278 -5.713* .130 .371 -1.554 -1.318 
FCF 6.68E-005 .374 -4.28E-005 -.279 4.32E-005 .084 
INTA .110 .165 .738 1.293 -1.007 -.526 
NDTS -2.645 -1.608 7.660 5.578* -.203 -.044 
F-Value 9.680* 5.003* 0.336 
R-square 0.195 0.104 0.008 
      Note: *p < 1%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 10% 
 
In the reverse causality, in which capital structure is endogenous variable, a 
positively and significantly relation between leverage and Tobin’s Q is consistent 
with the incentive signaling approach, which debt can be used to signal the fact 
that firm has prospect and equity issues may be interpreted as a negative signal. 
Ross (1977) argues that a firm with better prospects can issue more debt than one 
with lower prospects, because the issue of debt by the latter will result in a higher 
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probability of bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs, which is a costly 
outcome to management. This result is also consistent with the resource 
constraints approach (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which argues, that in the 
situation, where an entrepreneur has limited resources, then the question of should 
capital be raised as equity or debt becomes an issue. However, this research result 
is different from Krishnan and Moyer (1997) who found a negative and significant 
impact of total debt to total equity (TD/TE) on firm performance. Otherwise, 
another study by Gleason et al. (2000) found that firm’s capital structure has a 
negative and significant impact on firm’s performance 
 
The SIZE dummy variables have negative and significant coefficients, suggesting 
that larger firms tend to be less efficient, everything else equal. It is also 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that larger firms are better diversified 
and they can thus hold less capital to buffer against losses. It can be said that the 
significance of firm size indicates that large firms earn higher returns compared to 
smaller firms, presumably as a result of diversification of investment and 
economies of scale. This result is consistent with previous findings including 




Generally, the multivariate regression results support the prior researches. In the 
relationship between leverage (as endogenous variable) and firm performance and 
the probability of its non-monotonic relationship under the framework of agency 
theory, this research find that the East Asian companies after the crisis apply the 
efficiency-risk hypothesis. Meanwhile, a positively and significantly relation 
between leverage and Tobin’s Q, which performance measure is endogenous 
variable, is consistent with the incentive signaling approach, which debt can be 
used to signal the fact that firm has prospect and equity issues may be interpreted 
as a negative signal. in practice, firm managers who are able to identify the 
optimal capital structure are rewarded by minimizing the firm cost of finance 
thereby maximizing the firm’s revenue. If a firm’s capital structure influences a 
firm’s performance, then it is reasonable to expect that the firm’s capital structure 
would affect the firm’s health and its likelihood of default. 
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